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On a Dilemma of Redistribution
Alexandru Marcoci∗†
Abstract
McKenzie Alexander (2013) presents a dilemma for a social planner who wants to correct
the unfair distribution of an indivisible good between two equally worthy individuals or groups:
either she guarantees a fair outcome, or she follows a fair procedure (but not both). In this
paper I show that this dilemma only holds if the social planner can redistribute the good in
question at most once. To wit, the bias of the initial distribution always washes out when we
allow for sufficiently many redistributions.
1 Introduction
McKenzie Alexander (2013) presents a dilemma for a social planner who wants to correct the unfair
distribution of an indivisible good between two equally worthy individuals or groups (call them a
and b):
Dilemma Either she guarantees a fair outcome, or she follows a fair procedure (but not both).
The argument is disconcertingly simple. Suppose the initial distribution is biased against b.
If b nevertheless receives the good against all odds, as it were, it would seem unfair to take it
away from her. However, if a receives the good then the social planner would want to intervene
and redistribute. There are two strategies the social planner could follow when redistributing: the
redistribution could be fair, offering equal chances to a and b of winning the good redistributed,
or it could be unfair. McKenzie Alexander proves that if the social planner follows the former
strategy, then ex ante, a and b have unequal chances of receiving the good. The procedure for
redistributing is fair, but the outcome is that b is favoured (overall). On the other hand, if the
social planner follows the latter strategy, then equal chances can be guaranteed ex ante, assuming
the social planner chooses the appropriate biased lottery, but the redistribution would be biased
against b. To wit, the social planner can either employ a fair redistribution procedure or guarantee
a fair distributive mechanism ex ante. But not both!
McKenzie Alexander doesn’t explicitly mention Broome’s (1990) theory of fairness, but his
Dilemma poses an interesting challenge to it. Broome famously construed fairness as the propor-
tional satisfaction of claims. In the case in which a social planner is deciding on the distribution
of an indivisible good between two equally worthy candidates, Broome’s theory requires that both
candidates be given an equal chance of getting the good (Broome, 1990, 96). However, assume that
a miscalculation took place in the distribution of an indivisible good. Can someone trying to act
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fairly, given Broome’s understanding of the term, redress the unfairness of the initial allocation?
If the answer to this question is ‘no’, then Broome’s theory of fairness would be in trouble as one
would expect the demands of fairness in distribution to cohere with the demands of fairness in
redistribution. McKenzie Alexander’s Dilemma seems to suggest Broome’s theory fails this test.
In this paper I show that Dilemma only holds if the social planner can redistribute the good in
question at most once. More precisely, irrespective of the bias of the initial unfair distribution, a
social planner can secure a fair overall outcome through fair redistributions. Consequently, Dilemma
doesn’t pose a challenge to Broome’s theory of fairness as long as we allow for iterated rounds of
redistribution.
2 McKenzie Alexander’s argument
Consider the following formal representation of the initial (unfair) distribution McKenzie Alexan-
der’s social planner is trying to correct:
1
3
zz
2
3
$$
a : L; b : W a : W ; b : L p0b(W ) =
1
3
There are two ways the scenario can play out. Either a wins (W, and b loses, L) or b wins. The
chance of a winning is 23 and the chance of b winning is the complement,
1
3 . McKenzie Alexander
assumes that because a and b are equally worthy they should get an equal claim to the good (which
is what Broome’s theory would require, as well). However, since b’s chance of receiving the good
is less than 12 as a result of this distribution, it means she is aggrieved. If the b nevertheless wins,
Mckenzie Alexander contends the social planner should refrain from interfering. Taking the good
away from b would be like punishing her for making it despite the odds which were stacked against
her. So the social planner should only interfere when a wins this distribution. In other words,
the protocol McKenzie Alexander believes a social planner motivated by consideration of fairness
should be following is the following:
1. In an unfair decision procedure, the aggrieved has the right to demand an appeal, using a fair
decision procedure, if she loses;
2. In an unfair decision procedure, the loser does not have the right to demand an appeal, using
a fair decision procedure, if he was favoured. (McKenzie Alexander, 2013, 228)
These two principles are minimal under Broome’s theory of fairness. I take the first principle
to be a self-evident consequence of Broome’s theory of fairness. In order to establish the second
principle, assume first that each individual (or group) has an equal chance of receiving the good
(i.e. their chances would be proportional to their claims, which are equal in McKenzie Alexander’s
scenario). Then, according to Broome, the allocation of the good would be fair and hence the
party that does not receive the good cannot claim that it has been treated unfairly and ask for
any kind of redress - they were given “a sort of surrogate satisfaction” (Broome, 1990, 98). Now
imagine one of the parties has a chance of receiving the good that far exceeds their claim but
nevertheless doesn’t receive the good. It seems that if they didn’t have a claim when their chances
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were proportional with their claim, they shouldn’t have a claim when their chances exceed their
claim as their surrogate satisfaction now exceeds what they were owed.
Returning to McKenzie Alexander’s scenario, assume the social planner decides to redistribute
the good through a fair procedure (in which the probability with which the two individuals receive
the good is commensurate to their claim).
1
3
vv
2
3
((
a : L; b : W a : W ; b : L
1
2
xx
1
2
&&
p0b(W ) =
1
3
a : L; b : W a : W ; b : L p1b(W ) =
1
3 +
2
3 × 12
At the level of the redistribution both a and b are given an equal chance of winning the good
by the social planner. This is in line with their (equal) claim. However, if this is how the social
planner interferes, the redistributive mechanism he thus creates awards b an ex ante higher chance
of winning the good than her claim, p1b(W ) =
2
3 . If we assume that a had no doing in the initial
bias in his favour, we have a strong intuition this set-up is unfair.
3 From one-shot to iterated redistributions
By redistributing fairly, i.e. according to the claims of the two individuals involved, the social
planner generated an ex ante unfair mechanism. Can the social planner do anything to correct this
ex ante unfairness? The answer is YES. He can redistribute once again if the individual aggrieved by
the last redistribution performed does not win the good. In this case, after the first redistribution,
a is left with a chance of winning less than his claim, and hence now becomes the aggrieved party.
So whenever a loses the good, the social planner seems entitled to offer him another, fair chance
(as per McKenzie’s first principle).
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Evaluate the situation after the first redistribution: a is now aggrieved since a’s ex ante chance
of winning the good, p1a(W ) =
1
3 <
1
2 . Therefore the social planner can redistribute again whenever
a loses the redistribution. After the second redistribution, both individuals a and b now have equal
ex ante chances of winning the good which is being distributed and hence there is no need for the
social planner to correct when one of them loses. This is good news, but notice that the analysis
was dependent on the initial bias. It worked for p = 13 . Does the solution work for all initial biases
(for all unfair distributions)? The answer is again YES. Figure 1 tracks how the ex ante chances
of winning the good evolve over 10 redistributions for values of the initial bias between 0 and 12 in
0.01 increments. A formal proof is provided in the Appendix.
Figure 1: Ex ante probability of winning the good over 10 redistributions for different initial biases
McKenzie Alexander writes that
[s]ometimes the correct response to an injustice generated by an unfair decision proce-
dure is to use another unfair decision procedure, which appears to disadvantage (in some
sense) the same person again. In these cases, two wrongs do make a right. (McKen-
zie Alexander, 2013, 230, my emphasis)
The result of this paper then is that the bias against an aggrieved individual (or group) always
washes out when we allow for sufficiently many redistributions. In other words, we do not have
to make a second wrong in order to make right by the aggrieved: at most infinitely many rights
will do. This is encouraging. But even if it is always the case that a social planner can correct an
initial unfair distribution by behaving fairly towards both the aggrieved and the party favoured in
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the initial distribution, no social planner has infinite time and resources. Can anything better be
done for real social planners? The answer is one last time YES.
I contend it is unproblematic to assume people are not sensitive to minute differences in prob-
abilities. Then let the sensitivity of the most sensitive member of the two person/group society we
are concerned about in this paper be δ. I investigated two possible values for δ: δ1 = 0.001 and
δ2 = 0.01. Under δ1 the individuals in the society cannot tell a .500 chance of winning the good
apart from a .5001 chance. Under δ2 they cannot tell apart a .50 from a .51 chance of winning the
good. It turns out that for δ1 it takes at most nine redistributions for the probability of winning
for b to reach the interval [.499, .501] and hence become identical to 12 . For δ2, the probability of
winning for b reaches a value in [.49, .51] in at most six redistributions.This resulted by testing all
values of the initial bias, p, between 0 and 12 in 0.01 increments in Mathematica 9. That is, the
question I asked was “in how many redistributions does the probability of winning for the aggrieved
reach a value in the interval [.499, .501] (for δ1)/[.49, .51] (for δ2)”? And I investigated the following
values for the initial bias against the aggrieved p ∈ {.01, .02, .03, . . . , .48, .49}.1
The result is interesting as it tells us that no matter what the bias of an initial distribution is, it
is always possible for a social planner to offer the two participants to the distribution equal ex ante
chances of winning the good if at most six rounds of fair redistributions are available (assuming
that the most sensitive of the aggrieved and the favoured of the original distribution has sensitivity
δ2).
4 Conclusion
To sum up, contrary to McKenzie Alexander’s point, there is no tension between procedural and
outcome fairness as long as the social planner is given the opportunity to redistribute sufficiently
many times. It may be the case that “sometimes... two wrongs make a right” but so do a wrong
and infinitely many rights. And in fact, a wrong and sufficiently many rights (depending on p and
δ) are right enough.2
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Appendix
Let xi stand for the probability of the aggrieved of the initial distribution winning after the i
th
redistribution,
x1 = p+ (1− p)1
2
xn = xn−1 + (1− p) 1
2n
iff xn−1 <
1
2
= xn−1 − (1− p) 1
2n
iff xn−1 >
1
2
=
1
2
iff xn−1 =
1
2
We can now formally state the main result of this paper: limn→∞(xn) = 12 . Let the following
sequences stand for the elements in (xn) less than
1
2 and greater than
1
2 , respectively:
(an) = {a ∈ (xn) : a < 1
2
}
(bn) = {b ∈ (xn) : b > 1
2
}
In order to establish the result in the paper it is enough to prove that the limit of both (an)
and (bn) is
1
2 . The proofs are symmetrical and we will only show the proof for (bn). We will first
show that (bn) is decreasing and then (by the Squeezing Theorem) that its limit is indeed
1
2 .
Take bm ∈ (bn). By construction, bm ∈ (xn). Suppose it corresponds to element xn ∈ (xn).
Remark that m may differ from n. Since bm >
1
2 , xn >
1
2 . Therefore xn+1 = xn − (1 − p) 12n+1 . If
xn+1 >
1
2 then xn+1 = bm+1 if not, xn+2 = xn − (1 − p) 12n+1 + (1 − p) 12n+2 and so on. Therefore,
depending on the value of p, bm+1 = xn+kn , for some natural number kn.
3
bm+1 = xn − (1− p) 1
2n+1
+ (1− p) 1
2n+2
+ · · ·+ (1− p) 1
2n+kn
= xn − (1− p)( 1
2n+1
− 1
2n+2
− · · · − 1
2n+kn
)
= xn − (1− p) 1
2n+kn
In consequence,
bm − bm+1 = xn − xn + (1− p) 1
2n+kn
= (1− p) 1
2n+kn
> 0
This concludes the proof that (bm) is a decreasing sequence. In order to show that the limit of
all elements in (xn) greater than
1
2 when n→∞ is 12 it is enough to show that
3kn has to be at least 1, in which case both xn and xn+1 are greater than
1
2
; and kn+1 ≥ kn
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12
− 1
2n
≤ (xn)xn≥ 12 ≤
1
2
+
1
2n+1+kn+1
If this is the case, by the Squeeze Theorem
limn→∞(xn)xn≥ 12 = limn→∞(
1
2
− 1
2n
) = limn→∞(
1
2
+
1
2n+1+kn
) =
1
2
The first inequality obviously holds since all elements of the sequence ( 12 − 12n ) are at most
1
2 . And all elements of (xn)xn≥ 12 ≥
1
2 , by construction. Then we only need to check the second
inequality. We do this by induction:
x1 = p+ (1− p)1
2
≤ 1
2
+
1
21+1+k1
Since k1 is 0 (as x1 ≥ 12 for all values of p), the right hand side of the inequality will equal 34
which is the highest value (xn) reaches:
xn ≤ 1
2
+
1
2n+1+kn
xn − (1− p) 1
2n+kn
≤ 1
2
+
1
2n+1+kn
− (1− p) 1
2n+kn
xn+k ≤ 1
2
+
1
2n+1+kn
− (1− p) 1
2n+kn
What the induction aims to establish is that xn+kn ≤ 12 + 12n+2+kn+1 . So we need to show that
(the following reasoning steps are all equivalent):
1
2
+
1
2n+1+kn
− (1− p) 1
2n+kn
≤ 1
2
+
1
2n+2+kn+1
1
2n+1+kn
− 1
2n+2+kn+1
≤ (1− p) 1
2n+kn
21+kn+1−kn − 1 ≤ (1− p)22+kn+1−kn
21+kn+1−kn − (1− p)22+kn+1−kn ≤ 1
21+kn+1−kn(1− 2 + p) ≤ 1
21+kn+1−kn(p− 1) ≤ 1
But p− 1 < 0 for all values of p
Therefore, for all values of p, all n: xn ≤ 12 + 12n+1+kn . This concludes the proof.
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